Jensen follows Hitachi
Remember the Hitachi
decision in which the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld a Court
of International Trade decision that Customs and Border Protection is under no
legal obligation to decide a protest within the two-year period provided in the
statute and regulations? We discussed it here.
A related issue was addressed in Norman G. Jensen, Inc. v. United States, which we discussed here.
The Federal Circuit has now decided the appeal in Jensen. And, in what is probably not a
surprise, has affirmed the dismissal of the case. Jensen is different than Hitachi
in that Jensen tried to force Customs to decide the protest via a legal tool
known as a writ of mandamus. Jensen
brought its case under 28 U.S.C. 1581(i), which is the residual provision
giving the Court of International Trade jurisdiction to review decisions
relating to the administration and enforcement of the collection of revenue on
imports, provided there is no other
adequate means of securing judicial review. In most customs cases, the other
adequate means is via the review of a denied protest under 28 U.S.C. 1581(a).
Because there has been no decision on the protest and the two-year period has
expired, Jensen went to Court under (i) to force Customs to approve or deny the
protest.
In response, the Government moved to dismiss the case. The
government argued that 1581(i) was not the proper basis for jurisdiction. The
Government would have Jensen wait for, or force, a decision on the protest. The
Court of International Trade agreed and dismissed the action.
On appeal, Jensen argued that forcing a decision via a
request for accelerated disposition is not an adequate remedy because it will
inevitably lead to a denied protest and further litigation. Rather, its goal in
seeking a writ of mandamus is to
force Customs to consider the protests and issue a reasoned decision.
The Federal Circuit did not agree. According to the Court, a
request for accelerated disposition under 19 U.S.C. 1515(b) would result either
in a reasoned decision from Customs or in a deemed denial. Assuming the protest
was not approved, either a deemed denial or a denied protest would provide the
Court of International Trade with jurisdiction to review the protested
liquidations under 1581(a).
Jensen also argued that it had a statutory right to an
immediate decision because of the passing of the two-year period. This
argument, however, did not hold up following Hitachi, which held that the two-year period was not a meaningful
deadline. The fact that Jensen was only seeking a decision from Customs—as
opposed to Hitachi, which asked the Court to hold that the protests were
automatically approved—was not a meaningful distinction. As a result, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the decision to dismiss the case.
All of which is interesting background given that Hitachi has
filed a petition for review in the U.S. Supreme Court. As in all cases, the
chances of the Supreme Court granting review are slim. That may be exacerbated
by the fact that this issue can only come up in the Court of International
Trade and Federal Circuit. On the other hand, Supreme Court watchers tell me
that the Court may look more closely at Federal Circuit decisions because the
issues raised there cannot be worked out in other circuits. We shall have to
wait and see.
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