Digital Border Searches
Sometimes, the most interesting customs cases are not litigated at the Court of International Trade. They are in the U.S. district courts and involve important constitutional and administrative law principles not related to duties and penalties. Two of those deserve note here. This post will cover the first.
And, yes, I know there are more routine CIT and CAFC cases to address. Someone [a former government official who, despite this crack, I still like] event recently chastised me for being behind here. I promise you that my self-appointed obligation to the trade community weighs heavily on me. I will try to catch up.
But first is U.S. v. Kolsuz. This case involves CBP's suspicion-less search of a cell phone.
As background, you need to know that the law has been clear for decades that Customs and Border Protection is allowed to search cargo and the personal effects of arriving passengers without a warrant and without even particularized suspicion that they might contain evidence of a crime. In other words, as a general matter, your fourth amendment protections from unreasonable search and seizure do not apply at the border. There are lots of reasons for that. Primarily it relates to the ability of a sovereign nation to control who and what cross its borders (both entering and leaving).
There are a lot of things that are not permitted into the country whether or not it is a crime to import the item. CBP protects the health and safety of the public by interdicting, for example, unsafe consumer products, equipment that does not meet environmental standards, the products of endangered species, and agricultural pests. Every now and then, it finds illegal Mongolian horse meat and genitals. CBP could not do its job if it needed a warrant or even suspicion to check whether an arriving passenger has some contraband. Similarly, there are also many things that may not leave the country without prior approval. By crossing the border, the passenger and cargo become subject to inspection for any reason or no reason whatsoever. But note that if the "inspection" were by a street cop away from the border, it would be a "search" and would require a warrant if not incident to an arrest. Remember that the next time you arrive at the border.
An issue that has been percolating for some time is whether this principle extends to the contents of your digital devices. Can CBP review the contents of a passenger's cell phone or computer? That is a potentially far more personally invasive search than is poking around in the wet bathing suits and uninvited beach sand that is in many carry-on bags arriving with passengers. People have been arguing that a search of data should require grounds beyond simply being at the border. Lately, this argument is getting some traction.
You should note that Kolsuz had previously been stopped for illegally exporting firearm parts, so he was on Customs' radar. In this case, he was at Dulles airport in Virginia attempting to board a flight to Turkey when CBP searched his luggage and found firearm parts. Under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, the weapons can only be exported with a license, which Kolsuz did not have. After finding the weapons, CBP conducted an on-the-spot manual search of his mobile phone. After that, CBP conducted a more detailed forensic search of his phone. That search produced a report showing his contacts, emails, instant messages, photographs, browsing history, physical locations and other personal information. The full report was almost 900 pages long and took a month to compile using specialized software.
Kolsuz moved to suppress the introduction of evidence taken from the forensic search of his phone. He did not challenge the manual search.
The Fourth Circuit noted that the law has long upheld warrantless and suspicion-less routine border searches. However, the law also requires that enforcement agents have individualized suspicions before conducting "highly invasive," non-routine searches. In the past, this has generally applied to physically, personally invasive searches of, for example, body cavities where the "dignity and privacy" of the person are at stake or searches that destroy or unreasonably damage personal property.
In Kolsuz's favor is a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision called Riley v. California. In Riley, the Supreme Court held that cells phones may only be searched incident to an arrest with a warrant based on probable cause to believe the phone contains evidence of a crime. Riley was not a border search, but it did set a bar for local police indicating that the search of a cell phone is not the same as a pat down intended to protect the arresting officer and preserve evidence.
Kolsuz's first argument was that once the phone was taken from him (for a month) and he was in custody, the rationale for the border search exception dissipated and warrant became necessary. This makes some sense. To the extent the border search exists to allow the United States to control its borders and interdict incoming or outbound contraband, it has already served its purpose. Subsequent investigation, which involved the detailed search of personal data, should, according to this argument, require a warrant. The Court disagreed and held that because the search began as a border search and involved a transnational crime, it remained connected to the border and the border search exception applies.
The defendant's next argument was that a month-long forensic deep dive into a personal cell phone is "highly invasive" and not the kind of routine search permitted at the border without a warrant. The Court agreed that the forensic search should be considered "non-routine," involving a threat to the dignity and privacy of Kolsuz. The factors the Court found persuasive include:
There are other similar cases making their way through the courts. Eventually, this will end up at the Supreme Court. In the meantime, travelers take note. I have read lots of advice about encryption and burner phones and leaving all sensitive data in the cloud. I'm not going to give legal advice on this. You need to do what is appropriate. If you have concerns, talk to a lawyer.
Traveling lawyers should keep in mind that their phones and other personal devices may contain privileged information that needs special attention if stopped by CBP (or any police agency). Finally, corporate compliance policies should take this into consideration for traveling employees.
Hat tip to Peter Quinter of GrayRobinson.
And, yes, I know there are more routine CIT and CAFC cases to address. Someone [a former government official who, despite this crack, I still like] event recently chastised me for being behind here. I promise you that my self-appointed obligation to the trade community weighs heavily on me. I will try to catch up.
But first is U.S. v. Kolsuz. This case involves CBP's suspicion-less search of a cell phone.
As background, you need to know that the law has been clear for decades that Customs and Border Protection is allowed to search cargo and the personal effects of arriving passengers without a warrant and without even particularized suspicion that they might contain evidence of a crime. In other words, as a general matter, your fourth amendment protections from unreasonable search and seizure do not apply at the border. There are lots of reasons for that. Primarily it relates to the ability of a sovereign nation to control who and what cross its borders (both entering and leaving).
There are a lot of things that are not permitted into the country whether or not it is a crime to import the item. CBP protects the health and safety of the public by interdicting, for example, unsafe consumer products, equipment that does not meet environmental standards, the products of endangered species, and agricultural pests. Every now and then, it finds illegal Mongolian horse meat and genitals. CBP could not do its job if it needed a warrant or even suspicion to check whether an arriving passenger has some contraband. Similarly, there are also many things that may not leave the country without prior approval. By crossing the border, the passenger and cargo become subject to inspection for any reason or no reason whatsoever. But note that if the "inspection" were by a street cop away from the border, it would be a "search" and would require a warrant if not incident to an arrest. Remember that the next time you arrive at the border.
An issue that has been percolating for some time is whether this principle extends to the contents of your digital devices. Can CBP review the contents of a passenger's cell phone or computer? That is a potentially far more personally invasive search than is poking around in the wet bathing suits and uninvited beach sand that is in many carry-on bags arriving with passengers. People have been arguing that a search of data should require grounds beyond simply being at the border. Lately, this argument is getting some traction.
You should note that Kolsuz had previously been stopped for illegally exporting firearm parts, so he was on Customs' radar. In this case, he was at Dulles airport in Virginia attempting to board a flight to Turkey when CBP searched his luggage and found firearm parts. Under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, the weapons can only be exported with a license, which Kolsuz did not have. After finding the weapons, CBP conducted an on-the-spot manual search of his mobile phone. After that, CBP conducted a more detailed forensic search of his phone. That search produced a report showing his contacts, emails, instant messages, photographs, browsing history, physical locations and other personal information. The full report was almost 900 pages long and took a month to compile using specialized software.
Kolsuz moved to suppress the introduction of evidence taken from the forensic search of his phone. He did not challenge the manual search.
The Fourth Circuit noted that the law has long upheld warrantless and suspicion-less routine border searches. However, the law also requires that enforcement agents have individualized suspicions before conducting "highly invasive," non-routine searches. In the past, this has generally applied to physically, personally invasive searches of, for example, body cavities where the "dignity and privacy" of the person are at stake or searches that destroy or unreasonably damage personal property.
In Kolsuz's favor is a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision called Riley v. California. In Riley, the Supreme Court held that cells phones may only be searched incident to an arrest with a warrant based on probable cause to believe the phone contains evidence of a crime. Riley was not a border search, but it did set a bar for local police indicating that the search of a cell phone is not the same as a pat down intended to protect the arresting officer and preserve evidence.
Kolsuz's first argument was that once the phone was taken from him (for a month) and he was in custody, the rationale for the border search exception dissipated and warrant became necessary. This makes some sense. To the extent the border search exists to allow the United States to control its borders and interdict incoming or outbound contraband, it has already served its purpose. Subsequent investigation, which involved the detailed search of personal data, should, according to this argument, require a warrant. The Court disagreed and held that because the search began as a border search and involved a transnational crime, it remained connected to the border and the border search exception applies.
The defendant's next argument was that a month-long forensic deep dive into a personal cell phone is "highly invasive" and not the kind of routine search permitted at the border without a warrant. The Court agreed that the forensic search should be considered "non-routine," involving a threat to the dignity and privacy of Kolsuz. The factors the Court found persuasive include:
- the shear amount of data stored on a modern smart phone, which greatly exceeds what could be hand carried or packed into a car if printed, and
- the uniquely personal nature of the data on a smart phone including contacts, email, physical locations and web history.
There are other similar cases making their way through the courts. Eventually, this will end up at the Supreme Court. In the meantime, travelers take note. I have read lots of advice about encryption and burner phones and leaving all sensitive data in the cloud. I'm not going to give legal advice on this. You need to do what is appropriate. If you have concerns, talk to a lawyer.
Traveling lawyers should keep in mind that their phones and other personal devices may contain privileged information that needs special attention if stopped by CBP (or any police agency). Finally, corporate compliance policies should take this into consideration for traveling employees.
Hat tip to Peter Quinter of GrayRobinson.
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