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Showing posts from August, 2017

GSP and Sets

Here's a question. Assume pots and pans from Thailand individually qualify for duty-free entry into the United States under the Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP"). That means they have 35% of their value derived from Thai-origin materials or costs and are shipped directly from Thailand to the U.S. So far, so good. Now assume that glass lids for the pots and pans are added to the imported goods and those lids are from China, which is not a GSP-eligible country. Do the pots and pans continue to qualify for duty-free entry under GSP or is the entire set disqualified due to the presence of the lids from China? That is the question presented in Meyer Corporation US v. United States . The tricky thing about this situation is keeping separate tariff classification rules, entry documentation, and GSP eligibility. The classification of the pots and pans plus the lids is controlled by General Rule of Interpretation 3(b), under which the retail set is assigned a single clas

Ford Analysis

Since I promised and because it is important, here is my more detailed analysis of the Court of International Trade decision in Ford Motor Co. v. United States, Slip Op. 17-102 . The background is pretty well known at this point; here is the short version. Since the 1960's there has been a 25% duty assessed on motor vehicles for the transport of goods (i.e., trucks). This is the result of U.S. retaliation in a trade spat over European duties on U.S. chicken. As a result, the 25% duty on trucks is known as the "chicken tax." The rate generally applicable to motor vehicles for the transport of people (i.e., cars, passenger vans, and SUVs) is 2.5%. That difference creates an opportunity, which Ford has tried (so far successfully) to exploit. What if you were to import a passenger van, pay 2.5% duty, and then convert it to a cargo vehicle prior to delivery to the dealer or customer? Would that be legal? That is the question addressed and decided by the Court of Internatio

Chew on This

The important legal and possibly philosophical question to be answered in Mondelez Global LLC v. United States is whether the unflavored, and largely chemical, base for chewing gum is classified in HTSUS Heading 2106 as a food preparation or in Heading 3824 as a chemical preparation. While that is an interesting question, the most interesting thing about his case may be the procedure used to get it this far. It appears that the United States made a motion for partial summary judgment to ask the Court to decide a question of law as early as possible. This makes sense when there is a possibly dispositive question of law that can be resolved without discovery or the introduction of factual evidence. The answer to that question of law might lead the parties to resolve the case by settlement or, at a minimum, the answer provides guidance on what are the important questions of fact. Addressing the legal questions early, therefore, can be an efficient way to manage customs litigation. At

XYZ and Lever Protection (Part 2)

This is a discussion of the jurisdictional merits of XYZ Corporation v. United States . If you are not up on the ins and outs of parallel (or "gray market") imports, read Part 1 of this post. Remember what is happening here: Plaintiff, going by the pseudonym XYZ Corporation, wants a preliminary injunction to prevent Customs and Border Protection from granting Lever Rule protection to Duracell batteries imported in bulk or in retail packaging. The first question the Court has to decide is whether it even has jurisdiction to resolve this dispute. The Court of International Trade, like all federal courts, is a court of special and limited jurisdiction. It can only act if Congress gave it the authority to do so. There are two possible bases of jurisdiction in this case. The first is 28 USC 1581(h) , which states in full (with my emphasis): The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced to review, prior to the importation

The XYZ Affair and a Quasi-War Over Gray Market Imports (Part I)

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Every now and then a case shows up at the Court of International Trade that does not fit into the normal baskets of what tends to happen there. One such case is XYZ Corporation v. United States . Here is some background. U.S. law says that only the trademark owner or someone authorized by the trademark owner can import products into the United States bearing the mark. That makes sense and it is how the law is usually described. But, it is also incomplete. The law also provides that once someone buys the physical item bearing the mark, that person can do pretty much what he or she wants with it, including resell it and import it. That is the principal of trademark exhaustion. The idea is that through the authorized sale, the trademark owner has been fully compensated and has no lingering rights to control the further disposition of the product. That creates an opportunity for entrepreneurs. If a company can find a good deal on shampoo , chocolates , or Mexican cola in some forei

Good News (About Ford and the Blog)

Turns out that I am still alive and still consider this to be an active blog. I have been working very hard on a number of fronts and simply have not had the time to keep you all up to date. I'll be back soon. I know I will be back soon, because this showed up on the docket at the Court of International Trade in Ford Motor Co. v. United States: Order entered on 8/9/2017 Judgment: ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED; it is further ORDERED that Defendant's cross- motion for summary judgment is DENIED; it is further ORDERED that judgment is entered for Plaintiff; it is further ORDERED that the subject merchandise is correctly classifiable pursuant to subheading 8703.23.00 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States ("HTSUS"); it is further ORDERED that Customs and Border Protection, United States Department of Homeland Security ("Customs"), reliquidate the entry which is the basis of this case under the aforesaid